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RELATIVISM AND ABSOLUTISM: 
HOW BOTH CAN BE RIGHT
W OUTER VAN HAAFTEN
ABSTRACT: This paper makes a small point concerning the contraposition of 
relativism and absolutism. Relativism need not be vulnerable to the self­
refutation argument; as for internal consistency both positions can be equally 
right. They are asymmetric, however, in that according to the absolutist only 
one of the two positions can be right, whereas from the relativist’s viewpoint 
they can both be right.
Perhaps one reason why the dispute between relativists and absolutists 
is so persistent, is that both positions can be right. I want very briefly to 
show how, or in what sense, this may be so.
The relativist says: (r) Truth, moral rightness, beauty, etc. are 
relative to conceptual systems of persons or communities of persons. 
However, conceptual systems may vary and it will not always be 
possible to choose between them as better or worse because there is no 
independent criterion. Relativism does not exclude partial or even 
considerable overlap of differing conceptual systems. Nor does it rule 
out universal acceptance of the laws of logic or other basic principles, or 
preclude striving for the broadest possible agreement. Yet it implies 
that, even if exceptionally, a proposition p might be true relative to S 
and false relative to T  (with S and T standing for conceptual systems that 
different persons or communities employ; which is not to say that the 
possible truth of a proposition is dependent on the beliefs these people 
hold at any given time).
This position is not acceptable to the absolutist. The absolutist says: 
there is only one truth, truth cannot be dependent on persons or their 
conceptual systems; p must be either true or false, it cannot simultan­
eously be true (or true relative to S) and false (relative to T). In brief, 
the absolutist denies r.
The conclusion seems inescapable: we have here two fundamentally 
opposite positions. The relativist holds r; the absolutist holds a =  ~ r. 
One of them must be wrong. However, the situation is slightly more 
complex, as I hope to show.
Since Plato the objection to relativism has been that it must claim 
truth for its own position and hence cannot avoid inconsistency (e.g.,
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Siegel 1987). But why should this be the case, if one does not p re ­
suppose the absolutist's point of view? And would it not be quite 
consistent for the relativist not to do so? Surely, the relativist who claims 
that the truth of every proposition is relative but at the same time makes 
an exception for the proposition r expressing his relativism, is 
inconsistent. The situation is different, however, for the relativist who 
admits the relativity of his own position (cf. Meiland 1980).
The latter does not defend his position with less fervour and his 
reasons for it need be no weaker. He does not think that propositions 
can only be true in a reduced sense, nor does he believe them to be only 
partly (non-universally) applicable. The consistent relativist (R) claims 
that universal propositions can be fully true -  albeit always true relative 
to some conceptual system. Secondly, he believes that this can be the 
case for r  as well. Thus the relativist claims r  to be true and universal in 
scope,
The absolutist (A) may now point to the following inconsistency. R, 
he says, wants to hold:
1) r  is true; therefore a ( =  —r)  is false;
2) r  is true; which implies that (relative to A, for instance) a  ( =  — r )  can 
be true.
Therefore, R is bound to accept that r and —r can be true at the same 
time.
To this R may reply: That would be inconsistent, indeed, on absolutist 
presuppositions. According to the absolutist a proposition p is just true 
or false. The relativist, however, claims that p is only true relative to  
some conceptual system (abbreviated: true(S)) and therefore that P  
might be true(S) and false(T). This is in no way, however, to abandon 
the condition of consistency and the possibility of criticism in term s of 
inconsistency. Surely any person holding p and —p at the same time 
would be inconsistent and could be rightly criticised for that reason. B ut 
that does not exclude that p can be true relative to S and not to T.
So the alleged inconsistency should, according to R, be read as;
1) r  is true (R); therefore a ( =  —r)  is false(R);
2) r is true(R); which encompasses the possibility that a  (=  —r) is 
true(A).
Neither (1), nor (2), nor (1) and (2) combined are inconsistent (on 
presupposition of r ) .
It is in this sense that R claims r  to be true, and universal in scope. 
That means that R considers r to be applicable to A as well [cf.(2)], 
though admitting perhaps that he does not expect A to agree on this. 
However, the point is not whether A is willing to agree or not, but that A 
should come up with an argument against R without in fact repeating his 
own (A’s) presuppositions at another level. For then R can, at each 
(meta)level, maintain his claim (including with regard to A). To him , 
A’s tenacity seems to fit well into his picture and rather to confirm it.
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As yet, whilst A can be right on his (absolutist) presuppositions, R can 
be equally right on his (relati vis tic) presuppositions. Insofar, both can 
be right.
However, this is ambiguous; surely either may be right but can they 
be right both? Here the answer is different for the two parties. 
Distinguishing between persons or their positions cum presuppositions 
(e.g., the absolutist, or absolutism) and the propositions they hold true 
(e.g., a), we may conclude that according to the absolutist only one of 
the two positions can be right; whereas on the relativist’s view, although 
a and r are contradictory propositions, the two positions are not quite 
opposed and can be right simultaneously.
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